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This paper argues that the pari passu principle of insolvency law does not fulfil any of the functions 
often attributed to it. It does not constitute an accurate description of how the assets of insolvent 
companies are in fact distributed. It has no role to play in ensuring an orderly winding up of such 
companies. Nor does it underlie, explain, or justify distinctive features of the formal insolvency regime, 
notably, its collectivity. The case-law said to support the pari passu principle serves actually to 
undermine its importance. And the principle has nothing to do with fairness in liquidation. The 
substantive argument in the paper concludes by examining the actual role of the principle. The 
arguments made here have important implications for almost every debate about insolvency law, from 
the status of secured and preferential creditors to the appropriate role of corporate ‘rescue’ procedures. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many a challenge to the different priorities accorded to different types of claim in a company’s 
insolvency begins with an incantation of the pari passu principle. Finch states (on the second page of 
her encyclopaedic recent study on secured credit): “The normal rule in a corporate insolvency is that all 
creditors are treated on an equal footing -- pari passu -- and share in insolvency assets pro rate 
according to their pre-insolvency entitlements or the sums they are owed. Security avoids the effects of 
pari passu distribution by creating rights that have priority over the claims of unsecured creditors”.1 
Bridge sees an inherent tension between the “two fundamental principles of credit and insolvency law”, 
that of the freedom of contract which allows one to bargain for priority, and the mandatory pari passu 
principle.2 And Cranston, after considering and discounting lesser objections to the existence of secured 
credit, concludes that “there are other social policies antipathetical to extensive security, like the pari 
passu principle[,] which are less easily refuted”.3 
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The pari passu principle is said to be “the foremost principle in the law of insolvency around the 
world”.4 Commentators claim to have found this principle entrenched in jurisdictions far removed from 
ours in geography and time.5 In English law, statute itself seems to confirm Finch’s “normal rule”, that 
all creditors of an insolvent company are to be treated “equally” by having their pre-insolvency claims 
abated rate and rate alike.6 The principle is thought to be “all-pervasive”, and its effect is to “strike 
down all agreements which have as their object or result the unfair preference of a particular creditor by 
removal from the estate on winding up of an asset that would otherwise have been available for the 
general body of creditors”.7 The Cork Committee, despite noting significant exceptions to the principle, 
reiterated its fundamental importance.8 The principle is said to be supported both by the need for an 
orderly liquidation of insolvents’ estates, and by requirements of fairness. So it is not surprising that its 
invocation as the starting point for, say, the debate on the priority of secured or preferential claims, 
weights the argument in a particular way. Since the pari passu principle has been recognised so widely 
and for so long as vital, and since it serves such desirable aims as orderliness in liquidation and fairness 
to all creditors, any deviation from it must be a cause for concern. It seem to follow therefore that: 
“Before a creditor is entitled to claim a preferred position it must be demonstrated that deviation from 
the inveterate and equitable pari passu principle is warranted”.9 On this view, the priority, say, of 
secured or preferential claims is an abnormality, a pathology to be diagnosed and controlled, perhaps 
even “cured”. Since “equality” is the norm, the onus must be on those supporting differing priorities to 
justify their claim. To the extent that their efforts are unpersuasive, the case for priority must be 
considered not established, and the “default principle” of “equality” must prevail.10 
 
This paper seeks to overturn this order of things. It is argued here that the pari passu principle is 
rather less important than it is sometimes made out to be, and does not fulfil any of the functions often 
attributed to it. It does not constitute an accurate description of how the assets of insolvent companies 
are in fact distributed. It has no role to play in ensuring an orderly winding up of such companies. Nor 
does it underlie, explain, or justify distinctive features of the formal insolvency regime, notably, its 
collectivity. The case-law said to support the pari passu principle serves actually to undermine its 
importance. And the principle has nothing to do with fairness in liquidation. The paper concludes by 
examining the actual role of the principle. If the arguments made here succeed, then the initial onus of 
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justifying their position shifts from those arguing in favour of the priority of secured and preferential 
creditors etc., to those who support a more “equal” distribution of the insolvent’s estate.11 
 
Since there is confusion in the literature about the correct identification of the pari passu 
principle, it would be useful to begin with a word on terminology. The pari passu principle, as it 
appears in (corporate) insolvency law, has a fairly specific purpose. It seeks to be informative, to 
answer the broad question how insolvency law decides on the treatment of different types of creditor. 
The answer offered by this principle is that insolvency law “takes them exactly as it finds them”.12 Put 
differently, creditors holding formally similar claims under non-insolvency law are to be paid back the 
same proportion of their debt in their debtor’s insolvency.13 The pari passu principle, then, is one 
manifestation of formal equality in insolvency law. 
 
However, it is not the only one. As explained in the following Section, insolvency law itself 
creates exceptions to the pari passu principle, the most notable for our purposes being that in favour of 
preferential creditors. Some of the claims held by the insolvent’s employees, and some tax liabilities 
owed by the insolvent, rank ahead of general claims, such that all preferential debts must be discharged 
in full before general unsecured creditors are paid anything.14 The factor which causes confusion is that 
preferential claims also abate rateably as amongst themselves. Some commentators have therefore been 
led to regard the treatment of preferential creditors inter se as another application of the same pari 
passu principle.15 But this view is unsound in several different ways. Most obviously, it ignores the 
received understanding of the nature of the “equality” principle, that the determination of “equality” is 
to be made by pre-insolvency law.16 Second, it reduces the principle to triviality, since the principle 
now provides simply that those determined by insolvency law to be equal are to be treated equally by 
insolvency law. But now pari passu is not a rule or a restriction or a standard. It neither imposes a 
requirement which insolvency law must fulfil, nor does it shape that law in any way. It is merely a 
description of what insolvency law actually does, and it fits perfectly with whatever scheme of priorities 
that law might devise. As a triviality the principle is harmless, but for the same reason it is also 
uninformative. It no longer says anything about why insolvency law chooses to declare certain creditors 
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including fn. 36; the definition of the principle that she embraces in this article seems to be inconsistent 
with the one quoted at the beginning of this Section. 
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to be “equals”. Finally though, and confusingly, the commentators who regard the distribution to 
preferential creditors inter se to be governed by the pari passu principle, still accept that the existence 
of preferential claims itself constitutes an exception to that principle.17 Viewed thus, their position 
becomes something of a paradox: the treatment of preferred claims is both an exception to, and yet an 
application of the pari passu rule! Most readers would find it difficult to imagine too many other 
situations which both exemplify and contradict one and the same principle. 
 
It is suggested that this view of the “equality” principle, which renders the principle both trivial 
and paradoxical, is unhelpful and should be abandoned. A little care with terminology dissolves the 
paradox and restores the principle to its roots. A distinction must be drawn between the sort of formal 
equality represented by pari passu (the equality of creditors as determined by the pre-insolvency form 
of their claim) and other manifestations of formal equality introduced by insolvency law itself (such as 
that which holds between some employee- and some Crown-claims, but not between these and claims 
held by a trade creditor, say). Accordingly, references to pari passu in this paper are to be understood 
in line with this distinction. To break the monotony of recurrence, “the ‘equality’ rule (or principle)” 
will sometimes be employed as synonymous with pari passu. Formal equality other than that enshrined 
in the pari passu principle will be clearly identified by the context. 
 
2. THE MYTH OF PARI PASSU DISTRIBUTION 
 
Despite the hold exercised by the “equality” principle on the imagination of insolvency lawyers, the 
principle is sometimes acknowledged, as a descriptive matter, not to have too much application in the 
real world. After proclaiming that the principle is “fundamental and all-pervasive”, Goode adds that 
“This, at least, is the theory of insolvency law”.18 Fidelis Oditah, who also regards it as “fundamental”, 
explains at the same time that the pari passu norm is “shallow”, since it is subject to numerous 
exceptions, and since it does not in itself acknowledge the “obvious truth” that insolvency law often 
exempts those holding certain dissimilar pre-insolvency rights from having to submit to an “equal” 
distribution.19 The Cork Report noted that rateable distribution among creditors is rarely achieved.20 
And Keay and Walton state that the “equality” principle is “nothing more, and has little relevance, other 
than to act as a convenient default principle”.21 
 
It would be instructive to consider just how extensive these deviations from the “normal rule” 
really are. Disregard for the moment the priority given to those with a consensual property right. Goode 
explains that the treatment of secured creditors, suppliers of goods under reservation of title (ROT) 
clauses, and “creditors for whom the [debtor] company holds assets on trust”, all are not to be 
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considered true exceptions to the pari passu principle, since “such assets do not belong to the company 
and thus do not fall to be distributed among creditors on any basis”.22 Some five categories of “true 
exceptions” established by statute can still be identified.23 
 
First are rights of insolvency set-off, which are wider in effect than those available outside 
insolvency. Set-off applies whenever there have been mutual credits, mutual debits or other mutual 
dealings, before the onset of liquidation, between the debtor and any of its creditors.24 The cross-claims 
need not impeach the debt owed to the insolvent, so long as the requirement of mutuality is satisfied.25 
“The right of set-off on insolvency represents a major incursion into the pari passu principle”, since to 
the extent that there are mutual credits, debits or other dealings, the creditor able to assert set-off rights 
gets a pro tanto priority over others.26 What is especially significant given our focus, this priority is 
mandated by the Legislature,27 and operates automatically at the date of the winding-up order without 
the need for any intervention by either party.28 Parties, in other words, are compelled to breach the pari 
passu principle. 
 
Second, creditors whose claims arise after the winding-up order has been handed down are given 
a privileged position. Statute provides that their claims are to be treated as part of the expenses of 
liquidation, are therefore to be given “pre-preferential” status (i.e. ranking ahead of preferential 
creditors), and are to be paid, not proved.29 In additions, utility suppliers “may make it a condition of 
the giving of the supply that the [liquidator] personally guarantees the payment of any charges in 
respect of the supply”.30 
 
A third and related category is constituted by pre-liquidation creditors who can compel payment 
by virtue of their ability to inflict certain types of harm on the insolvent estate. This category covers 
payments to avoid forfeiture of a lease, distress or termination of a contract.31 In general, creditors 
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 “Preferential debts”, p. 94. It is suggested below that even this might be over-stating the principle’s 
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22
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C.f.i.L.R. 106. 
29
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whose continued co-operation is desired by the liquidator may be able to extract payments in respect of 
pre-insolvency debts.32 
 
Then there are preferential claims themselves. These include various taxes collected by the 
debtor on behalf of the Crown, including some PAYE deductions, unpaid VAT, unpaid car tax, general 
betting, bingo, and gaming licence duties, some pool betting duties, and unpaid social security 
contributions.33 Levies on coal and steel production, beer duty, lottery duty, insurance premium tax, air 
passenger duty and landfill tax have also been added to this list.34 Then there are certain debts related to 
the insolvent’s employees. These include any sums in relation to occupational pension schemes, 
remuneration of employees up to £800, accrued holiday pay, and any sums loaned and used for the 
specific purpose of paying employees’ remuneration.35 
 
Finally, various types of debt have been deferred by statute. These include debts owed by the 
insolvent to a director (including shadow director) found liable for wrongful or fraudulent trading, and 
ordered to be deferred by the court.36 Claims held by the debtor’s shareholders or other members qua 
members also fall under this head.37 
 
So the claims of creditors able to assert set-off, utility companies, post-liquidation creditors, pre-
liquidation creditors with post-insolvency leverage, nineteen different types of preferential claims, and 
claims of deferred creditors, all fall outside the purview of the pari passu principle. And even these 
“deviations” from the “normal rule”, while patently substantial, might in fact be “something of a minor 
qualification” to the “equality” norm.38 There are numerous other types of creditor not affected by it. 
Under certain circumstances, this includes claims held by accountants, solicitors, stockbrokers, factors 
and bankers, all of whom might be able to benefit from common law liens which arise by operation of 
law.39 Statute gives the unpaid seller a lien on the goods sold, and rights of stoppage in transit.40 If the 
insolvent was insured, a party injured by its actions (a tort creditor) is subrogated to its rights against 
the insurer.41 If the liability in question arose under circumstances governed by the Road Traffic Act 
1988, the insurer might be liable to the tort creditor even in those circumstances where it would have 
been able to avoid or cancel the policy as against the insured.42 This of course continues to disregard 
those able to assert consensual property rights in some assets ostensibly within the insolvent’s estate. 
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 See s. 151(5). 
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Consider these principles in the light of recent data on the sources of external funding for small 
to medium sized enterprises (SMEs),43 which provide insolvency law with most of its business.44 In a 
survey covering the period 1995-1997, 47 per cent of this was found to have been provided by banks 
(who often take security), 27 per cent by hire purchase/leasing firms (proprietary rights), six per cent by 
partners and shareholders (may or may not be deferred by statute), six per cent by factoring businesses 
(liens and consensual proprietary rights), four per cent by other individuals, four per cent by other 
sources, three per cent by venture capitalists (equity claimants, hence ranking below debtors), and one 
per cent by trade customers (who have the option of setting up Kayford trusts45). Also important, 
especially for small businesses, is trade credit. By some estimates, stocks and flows of trade credit are 
twice the size of bank credit.46 At least some (perhaps much) of the credit in this category also generally 
falls beyond the application of the “equality” norm. One survey (which, because of its age, probably 
underestimates the extent to which ROT’s are employed) found that well over half the suppliers 
surveyed (59%) used ROT clauses.47 This figure seems to rise dramatically, the more troubled the 
debtor in question.48  
 
These are of course the sources from which firms raise capital while they are solvent. These 
figures do not directly indicate the composition of the overall debt of firms which are in financial 
distress, or which are undergoing some formal insolvency procedure. Intuitively, however, it would be 
surprising if the debt outstanding when a firm became distressed generally had a structure very different 
from the one mentioned above. And in fact there is some fresh data which confirms this intuition. Julian 
Franks and Oren Sussman have recently compiled a data set of more than 500 firms which had bank 
debt, and which were in financial distress.49 This confirms that the structure of debt of the firms in the 
“rescue units” of the three banks studied is very similar to that for solvent firms as a whole.50 
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48
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receiverships and liquidations studied, 92% of suppliers had employed some sort of ROT provision. 
49
 The Cycle of Corporate Distress, Rescue and Dissolution: A Study of Small and Medium Size UK 
Companies, Institute of Finance and Accounting (London Business School) Working Paper 306-2000, 
April 2000 (published on 2.11.00). 
50
 For the three banks respectively, the mean debt owed to the types of creditor indicated as a 
percentage of total outstanding debt, was as follows: Main Bank 38.2%, 49%, 41.9%; Trade Creditors 
24%, 37.4%, 40.2%; Other Financial Institution 2.3%, 2.8%, 7.5%; Other Creditors 29.4%, 8.3%, 8%; 
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Even more significant is the fact that, in an overwhelming majority of formal insolvency 
proceedings, nothing is distributed to general unsecured creditors (the only category of claimant truly 
subject to the pari passu rule). It is estimated that there are zero returns to them in 88% of 
administrative receiverships, 75% of creditors’ voluntary liquidations, and 78% of compulsory 
liquidations. On average, they receive 7% of what they are owed.51 
 
So while the matter is an empirical one, and while the position would of course vary from debtor 
to insolvent debtor, the discussion so far and these statistics show that most types of claim either are or 
can be exempted from the application of the pari passu principle. It is also likely that in most if not all 
liquidations, hardly any claimant is paid pari passu. Given these reasonable deductions, one might 
perhaps be forgiven for questioning whether it is fair to describe the pari passu principle as “the normal 
rule in a corporate insolvency”.52 In fact, it is the differing priorities of claims which seem to represent 
the rule. What seems certain is that, in the distribution of the assets of insolvent estates, “equality” 
between different types of claim must be very much the exception. Put differently, even if unsecured 
claims other than preferential claims form the bulk of the claims in most liquidations, most of the 
available assets would not be distributed “equally”. The pari passu rule is supposed to govern 
distributions. It should be obvious, however, that distribution in accordance with this rule is virtually 
non-existent.53 
 
Some readers would object that the discussion so far does little more than state the obvious, 
since everyone knows the current law leaves little room for anything to be distributed pari passu in an 
overwhelming proportion of insolvencies. These readers dramatically underestimate the extent to which 
insolvency scholarship still clings to the pari passu myth. Leading insolvency scholars (and courts) 
regularly assert that this jurisdiction has a “pari passu insolvency regime”, that the “equality” rule has 
been varied “only slightly... in respect of personal claimants”, that the “present law... is disinclined to 
force particular classes of creditors to shoulder greater burdens” than others by causing derogations 
from the “equality” principle in favour of the latter (or against the former).54 With respect, such 
assertions very misleadingly push the pari passu principle to the fore as currently the dominant method 
for the distribution of insolvent estates. They are then used as premises in further analysis which in turn 
is often (not always) distorted as a result. That is to be regretted. Much of science could not progress till 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“Owner”-Directors 6.1%, 2.5%, 2.4%; see ibid., p. 8, Table 3. More on this in the penultimate Section 
of this paper. 
51
 ABRP, Survey, p. 18. This is supported by the Franks-Sussman data, which shows that the median 
recovery rate for unsecured creditors in a sample of 27 administrative receiverships is 0%; see Cycle, p. 
14, Table 9, n. 1. 
52
 To this author, ‘normal’ indicates a state of affairs which is usual, regular, common, average, or 
typical. 
53
 The implications of this distinction between the constitution of claims and the pattern of distribution 
is discussed further in Section 6 of this paper. 
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it had rejected the false geocentric picture of the cosmos. In its rather more modest sphere, insolvency 
scholarship must somehow tear itself away from the equally false view that the “equality” principle 
occupies the centre of the insolvency law universe. 
 
Still, let us take seriously the objection noted above. Perhaps the discussion so far has missed 
the point. The claim that priority is a pathology might not be a descriptive one after all. Those making it 
might, on reflection, be willing to concede that the pari passu principle reflects little of reality, which 
(they might come to accept) consists of widely divergent priorities accorded to different types of claim. 
The critics of differential priority might now argue the “equality” norm constitutes the ideal against 
which our existing insolvency law must be judged, since it enshrines desirable goals that any reasonable 
insolvency regime must attain. Deviations from pari passu are to be condemned for making the 
attainment of those goals more unlikely, and they are to be condemned even more precisely because 
they are so widespread. It is to this claim that we now turn. 
 
3. THE IMMUNITY/PRIORITY FALLACY 
 
For English lawyers, it seems the primary attraction of the pari passu principle is its ability to provide 
for an orderly liquidation. Goode makes the point firmly: 
 
It is this principle of rateable distribution which marks off the rights of creditors in a winding up 
from their pre-liquidation entitlements. Prior to winding up each creditor is free to pursue 
whatever enforcement measures are open to him... The rule here, in the absence of an insolvency 
proceeding, is that the race goes to the swiftest... Liquidation puts an end to the race. The 
principle first come first served gives way to that of orderly realisation of assets by the liquidator 
for the benefit of all unsecured creditors and distribution of the net proceeds pari passu.55 
 
Keay and Walton see the principle as the embodiment of similar virtues: 
 
the whole idea of pari passu distribution is to ensure parity of benefit, no matter what resources 
one has -- if there were no pari passu distribution we would return to the ‘first come, first 
served’ policy of mediaeval times, which saw those with the greatest resources and power taking 
the debtor’s estate.56 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
54
 These quotations are from Finch and Worthington, “The pari passu principle and ranking of 
restitutionary rights”, in Rose (ed.), Restitution and Insolvency (Mansfield, Oxford, 2000), 1, pp. 14-15, 
2 and 7, including fn. 33 (emphases added). 
55
 Insolvency, p. 142. 
56
 Keay and Walton, “Preferential debts”, p. 95; see also pp. 92-93. Bridge also regards the “equality” 
principle as reflecting the law’s interest in an orderly liquidation; see “Quistclose”, p.340, though he 
strikes a note of scepticism on the same page: just how “fundamental” could the principle be “when one 
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And for Finch, the “equality” principle “conduces to an orderly, collective means of dealing with 
unsecured creditor claims and... involves lower distributional costs than alternative processes such as 
‘first come, first served’”.57 For these commentators, the choice is clearly between a free-for-all where 
weak creditors would inevitably be beaten into last place by better-resourced competitors, and where 
the advantages associated with an orderly liquidation would be lost, and the pari passu principle which 
alone stands as a bulwark against this.  
 
What is more, and even given its less than universal efficacy, the pari passu principle, it is said, 
“retains some practical importance, if only in a negative sense, in that it may have the effect of 
invalidating pre-liquidation transactions by which a creditor hopes to secure an advantage over his 
competitors”.58 The principle is widely seen to be “very much at the heart of the rationale for the 
avoidance of pre-liquidation transactions”.59 Oditah notes that “In one sense, avoiding powers provide 
illustrations of insolvency law’s commitment to the principle of equality”.60 And Goode observes that 
“the principle of equity among creditors which underlies the pari passu rule of insolvency law will in 
certain conditions require the adjustment of concluded transactions which but for the winding-up of the 
company would have remained binding on the company”.61 
 
Given that the pari passu principle lies at the very heart of the orderly liquidation regime, and 
given its role in justifying some of the most distinctive and well-established aspects of insolvency law 
(its preference and other avoidance provisions), any deviations from it must naturally be considered 
odious at least prima facie. “Equality” of treatment serves key practical and justificatory purposes 
which bring social benefits; so differential priority, its opposite, must result in a diminution of all those 
benefits. Those defending the priority, say, of secured claims must therefore bear a heavy burden of 
proof. 
 
It is submitted that these arguments are based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
liquidation regime. All these arguments commit what will be referred to as the immunity/priority 
fallacy. Once that fallacy is exposed and exploded, the rationales given by those supporting the pari 
                                                                                                                                                                      
[must] look... for it in the Insolvency Rules and not in the body of the [Insolvency] Act itself[?]” 
(footnote omitted). 
57
 Finch, “Pari passu”, p. 194, noting a “traditional justification” for the principle. See also Finch and 
Worthington, “Pari passu”, pp. 2-3. 
58
 Insolvency, p. 144. 
59
 Keay and Walton, “Preferential debts”, p. 93 fn. 74, citing Keay, Avoidance Provisions in Insolvency 
Law (Sydney, LBC Information Services, 1997), 40-49. 
60
 “Assets”, p. 465. 
61
 Insolvency, p. 344; see also pp. 345-348, where the link between the avoidance provisions of the 
Insolvency Act and insolvency law’s “equality” principle is reiterated, pp. 387, 389-390 (preferences), 
and p. 423, which explains the rule against post-petition dispositions by invoking the principle. Goode 
does point out, however, that the principle cannot explain certain important nuances of some of these 
provisions; see especially p. 347; for a dramatic modification of the claim quoted in the text and the 
references above, see p. 441. 
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passu principle will be seen to provide no justification for it. And that principle in turn is shown not to 
play any role in bolstering the desirable properties of the liquidation regime. 
 
Let us start by understanding the distinction between priority and immunity.62 Recall again the 
old image, that of the debtor firm’s estate forming a pool of assets. As the firm approaches the stage 
where its assets are insufficient to meet its liabilities,63 and in the absence of a special liquidation 
regime, the firm’s creditors have an incentive to rush to enforce their claims. The earlier they can get a 
judgment and execute it, the more likely it is they would get paid in full, or at all. The tardy creditor 
would find that nothing is left for him, the pool already having been drained of all its contents. Further, 
and on the eve of insolvency, creditors aware of the firm’s troubles and able to influence its decisions 
might try to steal the first drink from the asset pool by getting the debtor to repay them. Their gain is a 
collective loss. The ‘first come, first served’ system encourages creditors to engage in duplicative 
(hence wasteful) monitoring of their debtor in order not to be left behind in any race to the pool. It adds 
uncertainty and therefore decreases the utility of risk-averse creditors. And for the debtor whose assets 
are more valuable if disposed of together as a going concern, the individualistic system increases the 
possibility that those assets would be broken up nonetheless and sold piecemeal to satisfy claims as they 
arise.64 It is this value-destroying activity that the dedicated liquidation regime must prevent. Notice the 
cause of all the trouble: each creditor faces the necessity, and has the ability, to act individually, in 
disregard of the interests of all others. Hence the obvious solution: the dedicated liquidation regime is 
collective, decisions being taken on behalf of all those interested in the asset pool. 
 
The analogy and the insight can be taken further. The individualistic pre-insolvency debt-
collection regime is a mad race to the asset pool. Since that race is undesirable, the collective 
insolvency system steps in to stop it. The creditors are now forced to queue up to have access to the 
pool. Voidable preferences and post-petition dispositions of assets etc. can now be seen as attempts by 
some creditors to bypass this queue. In other words, they represent efforts to gain immunity from the 
collective system. Insolvency law deploys various mechanisms to deny them this immunity.65 So long as 
there is no race to the pool, no one succeeds in stealing a drink from it, and creditors await their turn to 
have access to the debtor’s resources, decisions can be made systematically and in the common interest. 
Crucially, though, note that ensuring that creditors take their place in the queue is one thing. The order 
in which they line up is, in general, quite another. Each creditor’s priority is their place in the queue 
relative to each other creditor. But espousing the aim that creditors all line up does not entail any 
                                                          
62
 See Mokal, “The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditors’ Bargain, and Corporate 
Liquidation” [2001] Legal Studies (August): “[P]arties in the choice position accept a distinction that 
will be referred to as that between immunity and priority”. For the ancestry of this distinction, see 
Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on Security Interests in Personal 
Property (Mineola, NY, Foundation Press, 1987), 67 (discussing the “property right” and the “priority 
right” of secured creditors). 
63
 IA, s. 123. 
64
 See e.g. Thomas Jackson, “Bankruptcy, nonbankruptcy entitlements, and the creditors’ bargain” 
(1982) 91 Yale L.J. 857, and Mokal, “Authentic Consent”. 
65
 For example, IA, ss. 239 (preferences) and 127 (post-petition dispositions). 
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particular order in which they should line up. It does not commit the system to placing all creditors (as 
it were) unidistant from the asset pool. The pari passu principle would put each (“similar”) creditor side 
by side rather than, say, one after the other. But this arrangement is not a necessary concomitant to the 
absence of the value-destroying race. So long as there is a queue (with creditors standing side by side, 
one after the other, or in whatever order), there is no race. 
 
Consider now the various comments noted at the beginning of this Section. It can be seen that 
they represent the immunity/priority fallacy. This can be defined as attribution of the benefits resulting 
from the absence of immunity from a collective insolvency system, to an imaginary and irrelevant state 
of equal priority (the realm of pari passu). If the pre-insolvency ‘first come, first served’ system is 
objectionable in a firm’s insolvency, it is so because of the monitoring, uncertainty, administrative, and 
loss of synergetic value costs described above. All these costs result from an individualistic regime, and 
all of them are avoided by a collective one. As long as all those creditors whose actions would inflict 
those costs participate in the collective regime or submit to collective decision-making, how their 
claims are ranked relative to each other within the collective scheme of distribution is (for these 
purposes) irrelevant.66 
 
Similarly, if certain attempts to gain preference are undesirable, that is because they undermine 
the benefits associated with collective decision-making. Consider the following situation. In the 
liquidation of a particular company, there is only one general unsecured creditor (say a trade creditor 
without the benefit of an effective ROT clause) and one preferential creditor (the Crown). Suppose the 
former engineers a (voidable) preference in his favour, so that both he and the preferential creditor 
finally get back the same proportion of their debts.67 Now the situation here simply cannot be 
objectionable on the basis that the pari passu rule has been breached. In fact, the outcome would 
probably be perfectly in accord with this rule, since the general creditor is likely to hold the same sort 
of non-insolvency claim as the preferential one. So if the rule applies, he should get back the same 
proportion of his debt as the latter. However, the voidable preference provisions have been violated 
nevertheless. So the pari passu principle does not underlie these provisions, at least as they apply here. 
If this much is accepted, then the argument can be pressed further. It would not help to suggest that the 
principle justifies the preference avoidance provisions as they apply to a trade creditor who has been 
paid a greater proportion of his debt than another, say, but not when they apply to a trade creditor and 
                                                          
66
 The reader would have noted the italicised qualification as significant. Without entering into the 
debate about its justifiability here, it should be pointed out that secured creditors, for example, acquire 
both priority and immunity in their debtor’s insolvency. See Re David Lloyd & Co. (1877) 6 Ch.D. 339, 
344-345, per James LJ: “[The insolvency rules which deprive unsecured creditors of the ability 
individually to proceed against their debtor] were intended, not for the purpose of harassing, or 
impeding, or injuring third persons, but for the purpose of preserving the limited assets of the 
company... in the best way for distribution among all persons who have claims upon them... But that has 
really nothing to do with the case of the man who for present purposes is to be considered as entirely 
outside the company, who is merely seeking to enforce a claim, not against the company, but to his own 
property... Why a mortgagee should be prevented from doing that I cannot understand”. 
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an employee who both get the same proportion of what they are owed. To advocate this position would 
again be to create something of a paradox: that the need to provide ‘equal’ treatment legitimates the 
avoidance of a preference in the first situation, but actually providing such treatment constitutes the 
objectionable preference in the latter! 
 
In fact, to understand the basis of the preference avoidance provisions, we must switch to the 
perspective suggested above. The party given the voidable preference has been allowed to leave the 
place assigned to him by the insolvency system. He has been allowed to skip the queue for the 
insolvent’s assets. This is the factor which creates the preference.68 This example should make it clear 
pari passu is not simply irrelevant to understanding the preference (and several other) avoidance 
provisions. In fact, the focus on the “equality” principle can be positively misleading in this regard.69 
 
4. THE PARI PASSU PRINCIPLE IN ACTION? 
 
It is to be noted that the argument here is not one for a change in the law, for example to abolish the 
pari passu rule. The point is rather that the alleged manifestations of the principle are nothing of the 
sort. The law as it stands today is better understood by adopting the analysis in the previous Section. 
That the veneration of the pari passu principle is false becomes clear when one examines the case-law 
said to support it. It must be emphasised that the only purpose of discussing these decisions is to show 
that reliance on them in support of the pari passu principle is misguided. It should be noted also that the 
order in which these cases are discussed is thematic, not historical. 
 
Goode seems to cite Ex parte Mackay70 as authority for the proposition that “The pari passu rule 
may not be excluded by contract”.71 In this case, A and B entered into an agreement for A to sell a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
67
 This contravenes the rule that general unsecured creditors are to be paid nothing until all preferential 
debts have been fully honoured; see IA, s. 175. 
68
 David Milman and Rebecca Parry “Challenging transactional integrity on insolvency: An evaluation 
of the new law” (1997) 48 Northern Ireland L.Q. 24, 25-26, perhaps come closest to the view expressed 
here. See also Worsley v Demattos (1758) 1 Burr. 467; 97 ER 407, 412, per Lord Mansfield, who 
seems to regard as distinct two types of violation of bankruptcy law which result from a voidable 
preference. The creditor accorded such a preference gains immunity from the management decisions 
taken in the collective interests of all creditors by the trustee, and in addition, escapes having to 
participate in the rateable distribution of the estate. 
69
 For the “policy of section 127” of IA, which provides for the avoidance of post-petition dispositions 
of assets, see Lightman J. in Coutts & Co. v Stock [2000]1 W.L.R. 906, 909 (and approved by the Court 
of Appeal in Hollicourt (Contracts) Ltd. v Bank of Ireland [2001] 2 W.L.R. 290, 296): the provision is 
“part of the statutory scheme designed to prevent the directors of a company, when liquidation is 
imminent, from disposing of the company’s assets to the prejudice of its creditors and to preserve those 
assets for the benefit of the general body of creditors”. Again, the focus is clearly on the preservation of 
the insolvent’s estate with a view to its eventual distribution under the statutory scheme of distribution; 
needless to say, whether that distribution should be “equal” or otherwise simply is not implicated in the 
policy of this section. 
70
 (1873) 8 Ch. App. 643. 
71
 Insolvency, p. 144. Goode’s position is not unambiguous, since his argument on this point is rather 
brief, and is heavily qualified later on in the text. See also Oditah, “Assets”, p. 464 and the text 
accompanying fn. 37, who uses ex p. Mackay to similar effect. 
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patent to B. B promised in return to pay over to A the royalties received, and, in addition, lent A 
£12,500. It was also agreed that, for satisfaction of this debt, B would have a lien over one-half of the 
royalties received, except if A became bankrupt, in which case B might retain all the royalties. A 
became bankrupt. It was held on appeal that the provision allowing for B to have additional security in 
the event of A’s bankruptcy was void as being a fraud on the bankruptcy laws.72 Goode quotes the 
following parts of the judgment in support of the inexcludibility of the pari passu rule: 
 
...a man is not allowed, by stipulation with a creditor, to provide for a different distribution of his 
effects in the event of bankruptcy from that which the law provides.73 
 
...a person cannot make it a part of his contract that, in the event of his bankruptcy, he is then to 
get some additional advantage which prevents the property being distributed under the 
bankruptcy laws.74 
 
But neither of these dicta (nor any other portion of the judgments) make any reference to the pari passu 
principle. What they do indicate is, simply, that the bankrupt’s property is not to be distributed except 
under the rules of the bankruptcy system. Crucially, a creditor cannot, even ex ante, “get some 
additional advantage” in any way not itself allowed by that system. To resort to the analogy introduced 
above, he may not skip his assigned place in the queue, whatever that place might be. The decision 
provides absolutely no support for the very different proposition that under the liquidation system, the 
places assigned to creditors are all unidistant from the asset pool.75 Quite the reverse is in fact true. We 
must remember that pari passu was almost as rare in practice at the time of this judgment as it is now. 
The decision must be seen against the background of a system which (for example) gave extensive 
preferences to the Crown, including those provided by s. 32 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869. The Crown 
also had statutory liens over various types of property by virtue of the different Excise Acts. And the 
Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 32, had enhanced the pre-existing preference for certain debts owed to the 
                                                          
72
 See 8 Ch. App. 643, 648, per Mellish L.J. 
73
 James L.J. at p. 647 (emphasis added) (the same judge whose dictum concerning secured creditors 
was reproduced above). 
74
 Mellish L.J., at p. 648 (emphasis added). 
75
 That is the proposition it would have to endorse if it were supporting the “equality” principle. See 
also the only authority referred to in the judgment, Higinbotham v Holme (1812) 19 Ves.Jun. 88; 34 
E.R. 451, which was directly applied by Mellish L.J. (at 647-648). Here, a marriage settlement 
provided that in case the husband, having previously been educated for orders, should enter into trade 
and become bankrupt, his life interest would determine. The husband later entered into trade as a cotton 
manufacturer, and eventually became bankrupt. Lord Eldon L.C. struck down the relevant clauses of the 
marriage settlement as a fraud on the bankrupt laws (p. 453). There can be no doubt that “equality” of 
distribution simply was not at issue. The only objection was clearly to the attempt to evade the disposal 
of the bankrupt’s property by way of collective proceedings for his creditors’ benefit (pp. 452-453). 
Thanks to John Armour for emphasising to the author the relevance of this decision. 
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bankrupt’s servants and clerks.76 In addition, the Bankruptcy Act 1969, s. 39, provided for mandatory 
set-off in bankruptcy in the appropriate circumstances.77  
 
It should be clear distribution according to the bankruptcy laws was not distribution pari passu. 
The bankruptcy laws did not place all creditors side by side. The “equality” principle was part of that 
regime, but it was by no means the only part (it might not even have been the most important one). In 
addition, of course, on the facts of this case, the priority provided to B by way of the lien over one-half 
of the royalties was upheld as perfectly proper by the same judgment.78 So, to cite ex parte Mackay as 
an authority supporting only equal distribution is, with respect, quite wrong, since it is at least as much 
an authority for the prior inexcludibility of unequal treatment of claims, also provided for by the same 
laws. The only proposition this decision can be said to support is that one may not bargain for immunity 
from the collective bankruptcy regime (except as provided by the law).79 
 
The sceptical reader should turn to National Westminster Bank Ltd. v Halesowen Presswork and 
Assemblies Ltd.80  The House of Lords held (by a majority of three to one) that since the regime for the 
administration of insolvent estates embodies important elements of public policy, and since the rights of 
insolvency set-off form part of that regime, the creditor given such set-off rights cannot contract out of 
them. This despite the fact that the agreement which precluded insolvency set-off, and which was struck 
down by their Lordships, seemed specifically to have been concluded (inter alia) to ensure that “certain 
large payments which were due to the [now-insolvent] company should be available for distribution pro 
rata amongst its creditors”.81 The liquidator’s view -- that the party now asserting set-off should be “in 
no better position than any other creditor” in the debtor company’s insolvency -- was noted,82 but 
rejected.  
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 See Keay and Walton’s summary of the history of “Preferential debts”, pp. 86-91. 
77
 See Ex p. Barnett, In re Deveze (1874) 9 Ch.App. 293, 295-6, per Lord Selborne L.C. Interestingly, 
the other judges in this case, both of whom concurred in the Lord Chancellor’s decision, were Mellish 
and James LJJ, the judges who decided Ex p. Mackay. Being aware of this deviation from pari passu 
provided by the Bankruptcy Act 1869 (as undoubtedly of the others already mentioned), they could not 
possibly be taken to be laying down or upholding some overriding or general rule in favour of “equal” 
distribution in Ex p. Mackay (especially since any such rule gets not a single mention in either 
judgment). On insolvency set-off, see the discussion in the text, below. 
78
 See e.g. James L.J., at p. 647. 
79
 An identical analysis applies to Ex p. Williams (1877) 7 Ch.D. 138 and Ex p. Jackson (1880) 14 
Ch.D. 725. In both cases, the mortgagee’s right to distrain on the chattels upon the mortgaged property 
was a clear attempt to grant him immunity from the collective bankruptcy proceedings to which the 
mortgagors were subject, to the extent of the value of the chattels distrained upon. See also the similar 
case of Re Johns [1928] Ch. 737. All three cases are used by Oditah, “Assets”, p. 464 fn. 37, as 
demonstrating the operation of the pari passu principle. For reasons discussed in the text to which this 
note is attached, it is submitted that they deal with an entirely different point, with immunity, not 
priority. 
80
 [1972] A.C. 785 (HL). 
81
 See the submission on behalf of the company, ibid., p. 792A. 
82
 Expressly so by at least one of their Lordships; see per Viscount Dilhorne, p. 801E. 
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So an exception to the “equality” principle -- the contractual disapplication of which might have 
led to a more “equal” distribution -- is as mandatory as any other part of the liquidation regime. What 
cannot be contracted out of (in an unacceptable way) is not the pari passu principle, but the whole 
collective system for the winding-up of insolvent estates. Not only is it forbidden for a creditor to leave 
his assigned place in the queue and step ahead of others, he cannot even leave his place ahead of others 
and stand in line with them. The inequality inherent in the system (in this case by way of insolvency set-
off) is every bit as binding as the equality. Note again that the focus is on attempts to frustrate (some of) 
the rules of the liquidation regime. Whether that would lead to an increase or decrease in the “equality” 
of distribution is simply irrelevant.83 
 
Let us consider British International Air Lines Ltd. v Compagnie Nationale Air France.84 British 
Eagle (BE) was a member of a clearing house scheme operated by the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA). Sums due from participating airlines to each other were netted off at the end of 
every month. Those with a net credit balance would then receive a payment from the clearing house, 
while those with a net debit balance were required to pay into the system. BE having gone into 
liquidation, it was found that it owed money to several airlines, but had a claim against Air France (AF). 
A bare majority of their Lordships allowed the liquidator to recover that sum on the basis that the 
netting arrangements contravened the pari passu principle. The Lords rejected AF’s contention that the 
liquidator’s only claim lay against the clearing house, and that it could only be for the amount (if any) 
which remained to BE’s credit after the netting-off. According to the majority, the netting arrangements 
captured for the benefit of the members of the clearing house an asset (the claim against AF) which, but 
for those arrangements, would have been available for distribution among BE’s general creditors. 
 
That this case has been described as “[undoubtedly the] leading modern authority on the pre-
eminence of the pari passu principle”85 is not without irony. The case could not provide any support for 
the pari passu principle. Recall that this principle supposedly requires “equals” to be treated equally.86 
And the determination of “equality” is generally left to non-insolvency law: 
 
The Act of Parliament unquestionably says that everybody shall be paid pari passu, but that 
means everybody after the winding up has commenced. It does not mean that the Court shall 
look into past transactions, and equalise all the creditors... It takes them exactly as it finds 
them.87 
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 To similar effect, see e.g. Ex p. Barnett, In re Deveze (1874) 9 Ch.App. 293. 
84
 [1975] 1 W.L.R. 758 (HL). For criticism of the decision, see the Cork Report, paras. 1341-1342. 
85
 Oditah, “Assets”, p. 465; it must be emphasised that Oditah himself is unimpressed by the decision 
and subjects it to cogent criticism; see p. 466. 
86
 The rule that all those who correctly answer x number of questions in an exam are to get x marks, 
enshrines one type of equality. The rule that all those who take the exam are to get x marks represents 
quite another. The pari passu principle is traditionally conceived as analogous to the former rather than 
the latter rule. 
87
 Re Smith, Knight & Co., ex p. Ashbury (1868) L.R. 5 Eq. 223, 226, per Lord Romilly M.R. See also 
Oditah, “Assets”, pp. 463 and 468. 
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But even Lord Cross, speaking for the majority, accepted that AF, and other members of the clearing 
house, were never equal to BE’s general creditors outside liquidation.88 During BE’s solvency, the 
members of IATA could not (unlike BE’s non-IATA creditors) just have ignored the clearing house 
arrangements and sued BE for any sums owed. Correspondingly, BE could not, while solvent, have 
proceeded directly against AF. It could only have claimed against the clearing house for any net balance 
due to it.89 And yet BE’s liquidator was allowed to do precisely what BE would not have been able to 
do. By the same stroke, BE’s IATA creditors were forced to claim directly against BE (by proving in its 
liquidation) while they would have been neither required nor even allowed to do so before the 
commencement of its winding-up. Pre-insolvency unequals were forcibly “equalised” in insolvency. 
This hardly constitutes a vindication of the pari passu principle, no matter what the judicial rhetoric. 
And in any case, the sums recovered as a result of this decision would not have been distributed pari 
passu. Pre-preferential and preferential creditors etc. would have taken the first bite.90  
 
Perhaps a better way of understanding the disputed issues in British Eagle would be to look at 
the netting arrangements simply as an attempt on part of IATA to prevent its members from having to 
submit to the collective liquidation regime. Or at least this is how they seem to have been viewed by the 
majority of their Lordships.91 That such contracting-out (i.e. immunity) was not objectionable per se 
was also accepted. Lord Cross implied that, had the IATA arrangements created charges in favour of 
the IATA creditors with effects equivalent to the disputed netting scheme, those would have been 
effective against the liquidator if duly registered.92 So the objection was not to the granting of immunity 
to only some of BE’s creditors (or indeed to granting them priority over others). Rather, the majority 
were of the view that the advantages associated with recognising this novel way of acquiring immunity 
were not sufficient to outweigh (what they saw as) the costs of such a significant derogation from the 
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 [1975] 1 W.L.R. 758, 777C-H; to the same effect, see Lord Morris (dissenting), pp. 764F, 765A and 
765E; and Lord Simon (dissenting), p. 771F-H. 
89
 Ibid., p. 777C-D (per Lord Cross). 
90
 This point is impliedly noted ibid., at pp. 761B (Lord Morris) and 778H (Lord Cross). And needless 
to say, had there been a floating charge over the relevant assets, its holder would have been repaid in 
preference to general unsecured creditors. The same point again seems to have been missed by the 
Court of Appeal in In re Celtic Extraction Ltd. (in liq.) [2000] 2 W.L.R. 991, 1005D, where Morrit L.J. 
(delivering the Court’s judgment), invoked “the very considerable... public policy requirement that the 
property of insolvents should be divided equally amongst their unsecured creditors”, to uphold the 
official receiver’s ability to disclaim a waste disposal licence as onerous property. The Court’s 
assertion, that any assets preserved by the disclaimer would be distributed pari passu amongst general 
creditors, is of course without foundation. Any such assets (on the facts, there were none) would mostly 
go to any floating charge holder and to pre-preferential and preferential creditors. 
91
 Ibid., p. 780G-H: “[What Air France] are saying here is that the parties to the ‘clearing house’ 
arrangements by agreeing that simple contract duties are to be satisfied in a particular way have 
succeeded in ‘contracting out’ of the provisions contained in section 302 for the payment of unsecured 
debts ‘pari passu.’” Note the unnecessary (and inaccurate) emphasis on “equality” at the end of this 
quotation: what would have been contracted out of was the whole collective regime, its inequality (e.g. 
in favour of pre-preferential and preferential creditors) as well as its “equality”. 
92
 Ibid., p. 780C. The existence of such charges would of course accord priority over BE’s general 
creditors to IATA creditors, as well as granting the latter immunity from the collective liquidation 
regime. 
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collective regime.93 This conceptualisation of the majority’s decision then also allows one to make 
sense of the strong dissenting speech by Lord Morris, who emphasised the benefits which flowed from 
having the netting arrangements.94 On the arguments made here, the thrust of the dissenting speeches 
would of course have to be that these benefits (of allowing the arrangements to prevail) would outweigh 
any associated costs. 
 
Unfortunately, though, there seems to have been no suggestion in the arguments that the issue 
should be regarded thus, as a question of balancing the commercial advantages of recognising this novel 
way of gaining immunity from the liquidation regime against any lessening of the advantages associated 
with having a collective system. As already mentioned, the latter include the ability to preserve the 
going concern surplus if there is one, and the minimisation of uncertainty, monitoring and 
administrative costs. The IATA netting system should have been upheld if the costs to the actors 
resulting from any increases in uncertainty, monitoring and administrative costs, in the risk that a going 
concern surplus would be lost, and in the diminution of the pool of assets entailed by the existence of 
immunity for IATA creditors, were outweighed by the benefits it brought to the same actors.95 (Note 
that this is a sufficient but not necessary condition, since the initial distribution scheme provided by the 
liquidation regime is not self-evidently appropriate and therefore must itself be argued for.) The pari 
passu red herring served massively to confuse this issue. In failing to consider it clearly, it is submitted 
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 Ibid., pp. 780H-781A: “[It] is to my mind irrelevant that the parties to the ‘clearing house’ 
arrangements had good business reasons for entering into them and did not direct their minds to the 
question how the arrangements might be affected by the insolvency of one or more of the parties. Such 
a ‘contracting out’ must... be contrary to public policy. The question is, in essence, whether what was 
called... the ‘mini liquidation’ flowing from the clearing house arrangements is to yield to or prevail 
over the general liquidation. I cannot doubt that on principle the rules of the general liquidation should 
prevail”. Despite appearances, the objection to granting immunity from the collective regime was not an 
absolute one. As already noted, the judge had implied earlier in the same paragraph that he would have 
been content to allow immunity for the IATA creditors by way of security. This also shows the 
objection was not one of principle. There was no principle involved which laid down, say, that no one 
can bargain for immunity. The matter was rather of policy. One could only bargain for immunity in an 
acceptable way (the authority for this is British Eagle itself), and for the right reasons. Even if the 
method of attaining immunity was acceptable, the reasons might not. In Ex p. Mackay, the only 
discernible reason for the extra security was the desire of the creditor to better his own position in his 
debtor’s insolvency. Other creditors suffered harm without receiving any compensating benefit. 
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the British Eagle decision is deeply unsatisfactory.96 Be that as it may, for the reasons discussed, the 
leading modern authority on the pre-eminence of the pari passu principle actually stands more for its 
hollowness than its hallowedness. 
 
Ex parte Barter; Ex parte Black97 is another interesting decision cited in support of the pari 
passu principle.98 X, a Portuguese steamship company, entered into an agreement with Y, who were 
shipbuilders. Under the agreement, Y were to build and sell to X a steamship, the price for which was to 
be paid in instalments as the construction work progressed. On payment of the first instalment, the 
agreement provided that the steamship, its engines, and all associated materials were to be vested in X, 
the buyers (the Court of Appeal referred to this as the “vesting clause”). It was also agreed that X would 
have the right to seize all these materials if the construction work remained discontinued for a specified 
period, or if the ship was not delivered on time, or if Y became insolvent or bankrupt (the “seizure 
clause”). Finally, the agreement stipulated that, if any of the events mentioned above should occur, X 
would have the right to employ alternative builders to complete the ship, and to use Y’s shipyard, 
premises, machinery, plant, tools and any other materials present on Y’s premises suitable to the 
purpose (the “user clause”). The work commenced and the first instalment was paid. Subsequently, on 
Y’s insolvency, X exercised its rights under the “seizure clause” and took possession of the ship, 
engines and related materials. This was upheld by the Court of Appeal: X was merely seizing property 
which already belonged to it by virtue of the “vesting clause”.99 However, the “user clause” was struck 
down, since “a power upon bankruptcy to control the user after bankruptcy of property vested in the 
bankrupt at the date of the bankruptcy is invalid”.100  
 
The Court’s decision is hardly surprising, in view of the extravagance of the terms of the “user 
clause” if for no other reason. But in any case the relevant issues are very clear on the facts. We must 
note the two most important points. First and yet again, there was no absolute bar to the parties 
bargaining for immunity from the collective regime. This was quite obviously the effect of the “vesting” 
and “seizure” clauses. Instead of lining up with the rest of Y’s creditors and submitting to the collective 
decisions made by Y’s trustee, X was able to remove itself from the queue to the extent of the value of 
the materials covered by the two clauses. But second, the “user clause” was an attempt to commandeer 
Y’s remaining estate for the sole benefit of X, removing that too from the ambit of the trustee’s 
decision-making. This was regarded as unjustifiable. Even as to the “user clause”, X had argued that it 
would redound to the general good of all of Y’s creditors, since the completion of the ship would 
reduce pro tanto the amount for which X would prove in the bankruptcy for Y’s breach of contract.101 
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The Court of Appeal disagreed: in the absence of the clause, the trustee would have decided whether to 
complete the ship and claim the contractual price, or to abandon the contract, and this decision would 
have been made for the benefit of all of Y’s creditors. But the “user clause” removed the trustee’s 
ability to make that choice, and instead vested that choice in X.102 To the extent to which X was a 
creditor for damages for Y’s breach of contract, the clause purported to grant X immunity from having 
to participate in the collective bankruptcy regime. This attempt to gain immunity was regarded as 
unacceptable.  
 
Now whatever one might think of the distinctions made in the Court’s judgment about 
acceptable and unacceptable ways of by-passing the collective regime, we should note once again that 
the pari passu principle was not at issue. The “user clause” would have by-passed the inequality of the 
regime (inherent in the rules governing set-off, pre-preferential and preferential claims etc.) before it 
evaded its “equality”. The crucial issue was not X’s place in the queue relative to other creditors but the 
fact that he would not have had to queue up at all, and -- if that was not enough -- would have prevented 
the trustee being able to make a collective decision about much of the remaining pool of assets.103 
 
The same point can be made again and again. Cases cited in support of the “equality” principle 
either support that principle only as part of a significantly “unequal” insolvency regime, or more 
frequently, show nothing except the law’s intolerance towards attempts to gain immunity from the 
collective liquidation system in unacceptable or unfamiliar ways. In view of all this, the pari passu 
principle could not possibly be necessary for there to be an orderly liquidation. In addition to all the 
arguments above, to the extent that the current liquidation regime is accepted as fulfilling the 
requirements of orderliness and as replacing the value-destroying rush for an insolvent’s assets, and 
given that pari passu is a very partial feature of the system, the present liquidation regime itself 
constitutes a rebuttal of any such claim.104 What is more, the very significant departure from this 
principle represented by insolvency set-off has been regarded at the highest judicial level as itself 
necessary for a “proper and orderly” administration of the estates of insolvent companies.105 But then, 
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since “equal” treatment of different types of claim is not required to gain the practical advantages 
associated with the orderly winding up of insolvent estates, and since it is not necessary to justify 
insolvency law’s peculiar features (e.g. its collectivity, and the avoidance of preferences and post-
petition dispositions), the existence of differential priority -- including that of secured creditors -- 
cannot be impugned on the ground that it interferes with the attainment of these goals. 
 
Finally and in the interests of completeness, a decision which allows parties to bargain for a 
priority different from the one they would have had without that agreement -- but without allowing 
immunity from the rules of the liquidation regime -- is Re Maxwell Communications Corporation.106 
This case concerned an agreement whereby certain bonds issued by M Ltd. (held by parties referred to 
hereafter as “the Bondholders”) were guaranteed by M plc. “on a subordinated basis”. Subsequently, M 
Ltd. being insolvent, M plc. was placed in administration. The administrator applied for an order to 
exclude the Bondholders from participation in a scheme of arrangement under which, secured and 
preferential creditors having been paid, the remainder would be distributed pari passu among M plc.’s 
other unsecured creditors. In accordance with the subordination agreement, the Bondholders would 
only be paid if these other unsecured creditors were first paid off in full. It was clear on the facts that, if 
this scheme was approved, the Bondholders would get nothing.107  
 
It was argued on behalf of the Bondholders that the subordination agreement was void as being 
in breach of the pari passu principle: “the liquidator ought not to be required or entitled to look behind 
a proof to determine whether a creditor submitting a proof was entitled to payment pari passu with other 
unsecured creditors”.108 In effect, the submission was that the pari passu principle should be given 
effect with respect to all those general creditors who submitted a proof, the liquidator being required to 
turn a blind eye to the pre-insolvency dealings between the debtor and (some of) its creditors. This was 
rejected. Vinelott J. pointed out that “[t]here are situations under the Insolvency Act 1986 in which an 
unsecured debt is postponed to other unsecured debt”.109 In these situations, the liquidator might well 
need to have regard to the pre-insolvency status of different unsecured creditors. So if the liquidator had 
no difficulty in determining the pre-insolvency positions of various unsecured creditors and giving 
effect to statutory subordination, he would face no greater hurdle in dealing with contractual 
subordination.110 The judge read British Eagle as laying down the rule that “a creditor cannot validly 
contract with his debtor that he will enjoy some advantage in a bankruptcy or winding-up which is 
denied to other creditors”. However, he held that this did not preclude an agreement between A and B 
                                                                                                                                                                      
purpose, but only for the benefit of the party having mutual dealings with the bankrupt, see the sole 
dissenting speech of Lord Cross, ibid., pp. 812-3. 
106
 [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1402. 
107
 At p. 1404G. 
108
 At p. 1412C. 
109
 Ibid., mentioning as examples IA, ss. 74(1)(f) (sums payable to a member of the insolvency 
company) and 215(4) (sums owed to a director who has been held liable for fraudulent or wrongful 
trading). 
110
 Ibid., p. 1412E. 
 22 
Ltd. for the latter’s debt to A to be subordinated in B’s insolvency to that owed to B’s other unsecured 
creditors.111 
 
This decision should make it clear that the pari passu principle is far from sacrosanct. It is 
obvious that Re Maxwell allows parties to avoid it. The Bondholders, who would have ranked pari 
passu with M plc.’s other creditors, were relegated because of the terms of their agreement with M plc. 
to a position inferior to those other creditors. But this aspect of the decision should not tempt one to the 
hasty conclusion that the inexcludibility confirmed by British Eagle “applie[s] only to those rules the 
infringement of which would give one creditor an advantage denied to other creditors”.112 Resorting 
once again to the analogy of the common pool, this would amount to saying that, the rule is that within 
the insolvency regime, one can contract out of one’s assigned place in the queue if the result would be 
to benefit the remaining unsecured creditors in the debtor’s insolvency,113 but not if it would make them 
worse off. But this interpretation would be quite inconsistent with the House of Lords’ judgment in 
Natwest v Halesowen.114 That case shows one is not allowed to change one’s place in the queue for the 
pool of the insolvent’s assets simply because that would increase the bankruptcy value to be distributed 
to the remaining creditors. As already noted, the Lords there struck down an agreement which, by 
altering a creditor’s priority position, would have brought about just such an increase.115  
 
So when should parties be allowed to change their priority position within the collective 
liquidation regime, in other words, to alter their relative places in the queue to the pool of the 
insolvent’s assets? Only a hint can be provided here. Most obviously, an agreement to alter the priority 
position of creditors within the liquidation regime should be allowed when -- for all the creditors whose 
priority position in their debtor’s insolvency would be made worse off because of the agreement -- the 
expected benefits of the agreement to those same creditors outweigh its expected costs.116 (This again is 
a sufficient but not necessary condition, and is discussed further in the next Section.) 
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5. FAIRNESS AS “EQUALITY” 
 
We have considered -- and rejected -- the claim that the “equality” principle is essential for the orderly 
liquidation of companies, and that it underlies important and distinctive features of the collective 
insolvency regime. This Section challenges the other main role often assigned to it. The pari passu 
principle requires that all creditors (in positions of relative equality as determined by pre-insolvency 
law) should be paid back the same proportion of their debt in their debtor’s liquidation. Since this type 
of “equality” represents fairness, runs this argument, the pari passu rule ensures all creditors are treated 
fairly. Keay and Walton are of the view that “The underlying aim behind the use of the equality 
principle is to produce fairness, so that every creditor is treated in the same way”.117 As noted above, 
they argue that to abolish this principle would be to return to the “mediaeval” policy of allowing those 
with the greatest resources and power to deprive poorer and weaker creditors of anything in their 
debtor’s insolvency.118 This would be normatively unattractive. Several other commentators have 
suggested in a similar vein that the “equality” principle enshrines fairness in liquidation.119 
 
The debate about equality as a political ideal is long and complex.120 There is no question, in an 
article of this nature, of doing justice (as it were) to the issue of the type of equality, if any, that should 
be enshrined in a law -- or the law as a whole -- as representing fairness. This is especially true when, as 
here, the notion of ‘fairness as equality’ is only one of several issues to be considered. So the discussion 
here will be a summary one. However, it is suggested that even this should suffice, at the very least, to 
cast serious doubt on the claim that the pari passu principle conduces to fairness in liquidation. 
 
There can be no doubt that real equality is a -- some would say the only -- form of fairness. But a 
set of laws enshrines real equality only when it treats all those subject to it as equals. However, “[t]here 
is a difference between treating people equally, with respect to one or another commodity or 
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opportunity, and treating them as equals”.121 It is this crucial distinction which is universally overlooked 
by supporters of the pari passu principle. 
 
Let us distinguish, in a rough and ready way, between formal and real equality. In the relevant 
context, formal equality holds when the same rule applies to all people. That everyone must stop at a 
red traffic light is an example. This type of equality, while undoubtedly important, results in a fairly 
superficial form of fairness, the limits of which are easy to expose. It is not obviously fair to insist that 
an ambulance should be obliged to wait at the red signal just like any other vehicle, even though 
carrying a seriously ill patient. That access to a building is provided “equally” to all by way of a steep 
staircase does not necessarily prevent those using wheelchairs from being treated unfairly. Or think of a 
flat-rate income tax: regardless of how much you earn, let us say 25% of your annual income is to be 
paid over to the state. Many (perhaps most) readers would intuitively find this method of taxation 
normatively unappealing. That you are to be deprived of the same proportion of your income, whether 
you earn £10,000 or £10m per annum, would not strike them as particularly fair. Note here the parallel 
with the pari passu rule, which represents the decision that all creditors are to be deprived of the same 
proportion of their debts, should their debtor become insolvent. The problem is that a rule based on 
formal equality does not take into account important differences between people, even though those 
differences are relevant to any consideration of the rule’s fairness. Of course equals must be treated as 
equals, but who is to be considered equal to whom, and in what respect? Merely formal equality might 
resolve these vital questions by reference to trivial, or irrelevant, or meaningless attributes. But for 
equality to result in fairness (a morally charged concept), the determination of who constitutes an equal 
must be based on characteristics that themselves are morally significant. So a rule based on formal 
equality is often empty of normative content. To treat people with only formal equality is frequently not 
to treat them as equals. 
 
How do we treat people, then, in order to treat them as equals? One attempt to describe what this 
entails in the specific context of corporate insolvency is the Rawlsian framework of the Authentic 
Consent Model.122 The Model suggests parties are treated as equals -- and thus fairly -- when their 
respective interests are accorded equal care and respect in the selection of insolvency law principles. 
Space does not allow a fuller treatment of this Model here. However, the discussion which follows 
should be regarded as flowing from the considerations identified as relevant in it, and from the 
methodology it enshrines. Let us consider the proposal that in order to ensure fairness in the distribution 
of assets in a corporate liquidation, all those who hold a claim which non-insolvency law determines to 
be formally similar, are to get back the same proportion of what they are owed. It is suggested that in 
this general form, this proposal is unacceptable. The reason is straight-forward. Non-insolvency law 
does not need to determine the priority status of different types of creditor, since for most solvent 
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debtors, all creditors get everything they are owed.123 For that reason, non-insolvency law makes few 
formal distinctions between various types of claimant. The unsecured claim of a bank, a tax liability 
owed to the Crown, and the unpaid wages of an unskilled worker, all have the same pre-insolvency 
form. Non-insolvency law often does not resolve an issue which is (almost by definition) peculiar to 
insolvency itself -- who should bear how much loss when a company is rendered terminally unable to 
meet its obligations?124 So when an actor does become insolvent, to seek guidance from non-insolvency 
law to determine how different claimants ought to be treated -- as the pari passu principle purports to 
do -- is to commit the old formalist error identified above. The “equality” principle determines who 
counts as an “equal” by reference to an attribute of the claimants (i.e. the non-insolvency form of their 
claim) which is irrelevant or trivial or meaningless as regards the appropriateness of any method of 
distribution of an insolvent’s estate. 
 
This point can fruitfully be explored further. Let us isolate the issues of interest to us by making 
two assumptions. First, suppose there are only three types of creditor, commercial banks, the Crown, 
and the debtor’s employees.125 And second, pretend that the bankrupt’s estate must be allocated without 
reference to the parties’ own pre-insolvency interests and commitments.126 Now it is obvious that banks 
lend to thousands of companies (or more) and are therefore well-diversified. Banks can balance the 
harm of receiving somewhat less in the insolvency of some of their debtors, against the profit they make 
from lending to the many more who pay back every penny with interest. By virtue of being repeat 
players, they have accumulated expertise in assessing the credit-worthiness of their borrowers. And 
since they are strong commercial players in an under-diversified market for the provision of credit,127 
they have a strong influence on the terms on which they lend. So bank-creditors are very well-placed to 
deal with being paid back less than they are owed in any individual insolvency.  
 
On the other hand, employee-creditors might often be dependent solely on their salaries, might 
be unable to diversify by working for more than one employer, might have no insurance because they 
are not able to join a trade union which would buy such insurance for its members, might have had no 
influence over the terms on which they were employed and therefore became creditors, and might be 
unable quickly to find work on being deprived of a job by virtue of their employer’s insolvency.128 
Employees might be owed wages for several weeks or months, having supplied services to their 
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company while it was in financial distress without demanding payment on time, in the hope that the 
company would recover. Such employee-creditors might suffer serious detriment if they lose too great a 
proportion of their outstanding debts.  
 
Viewed thus, the suggestion that bank-creditors and employee-creditors should both be treated 
“equally” by being paid back the same proportion of what they are owed, seems absurd. That the two 
types of creditor hold claims judged under non-insolvency law to be formally similar to each other does 
not carry too much weight. To treat these parties as equals in their debtor’s insolvency requires that 
those in a more vulnerable position in their debtor’s insolvency be given greater protection than those 
better able to deal with the loss. Fairness does not result from treating the two types of creditor 
“equally”, so the pari passu principle -- stated broadly as above -- should be rejected outright as applied 
to bank- and employee-creditors with claims similar to each other under non-insolvency law. It is 
submitted the same reasoning holds mutatis mutandis for the various types of creditor different in this 
morally significant way, regardless of the formal legal nature of their claims. So for example, the 
principles of distribution resulting from this exercise are more likely to give employee-creditors at least 
a degree of priority in their employer’s insolvency over most other types of claimant.129  
 
It should be emphasised that the extent to which creditors are vulnerable to serious harm in their 
debtor’s insolvency is only one of several relevant considerations in determining their proper ranking in 
corporate liquidation. The point here is not to identify all such factors (or even to defend the 
preferential debts regime as it stands today), but rather, to cast doubt on the pari passu principle as the 
guardian of fairness in liquidation. It should be obvious its crude “equality” is almost entirely 
unattractive if we wish to treat all the parties as equals. 
 
This concludes the argument that the pari passu principle has nothing to do with fairness. But to 
leave this discussion at this point would be profoundly misleading. Recall the second assumption made 
above, that in choosing principles to govern distribution of an insolvent’s assets, we are unconcerned 
about the parties’ pre-insolvency rights and obligations. This assumption allowed us to focus narrowly 
on whether “equality” of distribution in corporate liquidation is normatively attractive. But while useful 
for that purpose, it is problematic and of course totally counterfactual. Creditors of a firm which 
becomes insolvent do not suddenly develop a completely new set of interests without link or connection 
with the interests they had before this particular debtor became unable to pay its debts. In their capacity 
as actors on the commercial stage, they do not undergo a re-birth which purges them of pre-insolvency 
commitments. Their interests and obligations within liquidation flow from their pre-liquidation ones, 
and are inextricably linked. So for example, to accept the very existence of claims against the now-
insolvent company is to acknowledge this inseverable link with the pre-insolvency commitments of the 
actors. And one of the reasons why employees are more deserving of protection in their employer’s 
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insolvency is their pre-insolvency inability to diversify, and (for many employees) to have an 
appreciable say about the terms of their employment, etc. 
 
It follows that, while the pre-insolvency form of claims might not matter, the pre-insolvency 
interests and obligations of all the parties must always be taken into consideration when deciding about 
the priority of certain types of claimant over others. Fairness demands that each claimant be accorded 
equal care and concern. But this involves looking at the totality of the interests and obligations of each. 
So the principles of insolvency law, though dealing exclusively with peculiar insolvency issues, should 
not focus exclusively on the interests of parties once a relevant actor is already insolvent. Rather, they 
should affect the parties in a way which pays equal attention to both their pre- and post-insolvency 
interests and obligations, conceived of as the continuities that they actually are. So the distributive 
principles of insolvency law should uphold any pre-insolvency priority arrangements which, for 
example, serve the entirety of the interests of each of them. This despite the fact that those 
arrangements do not serve the post-insolvency interests of some of them. One of insolvency law’s more 
challenging tasks is therefore to distinguish between pre-insolvency priority arrangements which are 
mutually advantageous to all the relevant parties, and those which are merely exploitative. The latter 
must of course be ruled out, but it would conduce to fairness actually to give effect to the unequal 
distribution resulting from the former.130 
 
6. THE PROPER ROLE OF “EQUALITY” 
 
The argument so far has concentrated on what the pari passu principle in particular, and formal equality 
in general, do not do. It would perhaps be useful to add a word here about what in fact their actual role 
is. Formal equality operates in three types of situations in liquidation, always for the same reason. First, 
let us consider the pari passu principle itself. Commonly understood as governing the claims of general 
unsecured creditors, it is submitted that this is not primarily a rule of distribution at all. On the contrary, 
it is a rule of non-distribution. The argument here can be broken down into four steps.  
 
First, certain types of claim are considered ‘important’, in the sense that they should be met to a 
significant degree in most insolvencies. To ensure this is the case, they are allotted special priority 
positions, either by the parties to commercial transactions, or (where the parties cannot be trusted to 
reach the right result) by Parliament itself. Second, not to provide a particular priority position for a 
type of claim is to ensure it will receive little or nothing in most insolvencies. Third and following from 
that, there must still be a fall-back provision which covers the treatment of these latter claims. In view 
of the paucity of value to be distributed to those holding such claims, it is especially important that the 
implementation of this fall-back provision in individual liquidations should be cost-effective. Finally, 
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the conclusion is that the pari passu principle is the ideal fall-back provision. This is the basic structure 
of the argument, and it must now be fleshed out. 
 
Let us begin by noting once again that in any formal insolvency proceeding, different claims are 
treated according to different priority rules, depending both on who holds those claims, and what sort of 
assets the claims are being applied to. Creditors able to assert set-off rights created and mandated by 
insolvency law beat all others to the extent of those rights. For assets subject to fixed charges, the 
chargee of course ranks first.131 For trade goods supplied under an acceptable ROT provision, the trade 
creditor can reclaim them. For goods subject only to a floating charge, post-liquidation claimants rank 
ahead of preferential creditors who rank ahead of the floating charge holder, and so on. All these 
priority rules are thought to have different rationales. For example, insolvency set-off is said to be 
based on consideration of fairness.132 The priority of (some) secured creditors, and of trade creditors 
with ROT’s, arguably stems from strong efficiency considerations and is mutually advantageous to 
all.133 Post-liquidation creditors are given precedence because they cannot be expected to subsidise pre-
existing claimants. Preferential creditors are said to be worthy of special treatment because they do not 
choose their debtor in any meaningful sense, do not negotiate the terms of their loans, and (in the case 
of employees) might be undiversified.134 The list goes on. The different priority rules are all complex. It 
takes time, resources and effort for Parliament on the one hand, and debtors and creditors themselves on 
the other, to decide what types of claim should rank in what order, with respect to different types of 
asset.  
 
Of course, however, the state of insolvency is by definition one where the debtor cannot fulfil all 
its obligations. (As already suggested, priority rules are really crucial only against this background of 
insolvency.) What we would regard as general unsecured claims, then, are those for which neither 
Parliament nor the parties themselves have provided specific rules of distribution. This must be viewed 
in the context that generally, only secured, post-liquidation and preferential creditors get anything in 
their debtor’s insolvency. There is little or (much more frequently) nothing for those ranking below 
them. So the interests regarded as more worthy of attention (and therefore arguably more important) by 
the rule-makers (public and private) are given precedence with respect to particular types of asset, in 
certain situations, to a specified extent. To decide not to provide for such a priority for a type of claim 
is in fact to decide not to have it met at all in most insolvencies. And it is this reasoning which provides 
the crucial insight into the true role of the “equality” norm. It was suggested above that pari passu 
should not be viewed as a default rule. It cannot accurately be regarded as the starting position, 
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departures from which must be explained. Instead, it is now submitted, the rule is best seen as a fall-
back provision. It is the rule which takes over when it would be pointless to provide any other.  
 
Here is the argument again. Some types of claim are regarded as important, and rules are 
provided to govern how they should be dealt with in insolvency. But once this is done, nothing (or not 
much) would be left for distribution to other creditors. Recall that most insolvency proceedings (75% of 
them or more) yield nothing for general unsecured creditors. And when they do bring some returns, the 
yields are fairly small (about 7 pence on the pound on average). So there simply is no point in deciding 
how these claims should rank vis-à-vis each other. For such claims to be governed by the pari passu 
rule makes very good sense, since the costs in terms of time, effort, and resources required to determine 
their appropriate (fair and efficient) rankings would far exceed any benefits. Why waste resources 
identifying and laying down different priorities, when it is obvious hardly any assets are likely to be 
distributed according to them? For such a situation, in fact, “equal” treatment is ideal. In most 
instances, this simply means some types of creditor equally get nothing. In the remaining minority of 
insolvencies, the tiny amounts available for distribution are all distributed proportionately, rather than 
being wasted in ascertaining the claimants’ correct rankings. The pari passu principle applies, then, 
whenever the costs of providing for different rankings for different claims would exceed the benefits. 
The claims it governs mostly -- and necessarily -- constitute something approaching a distributively null 
set; they are held by those who will not receive anything. If they do receive something, it would not be 
much. It is for this reason that the “equality” principle is most accurately regarded as a rule of non-
distribution. 
 
Now for the second application of formal equality in corporate liquidation, which lies in the 
treatment of the same “type” of claimant. For example, claims of all employees are treated “equally” 
and given preferential treatment over most other unsecured creditors. It was argued above that 
employees might be more deserving of protection in their employer’s insolvency than other types of 
creditor, since they are more vulnerable to greater harm in these circumstances. But of course this is not 
equally true of all employees. It is not obvious that computer engineers, software designers, commercial 
lawyers, and others with scarce skills are in need of the same protection as unskilled workers. And one 
Information Technology expert might be much better placed to deal with the insolvency of his employer 
than another, perhaps because the former is younger and therefore considered more (re-)employable in 
that young industry.  
 
But it makes sense nevertheless to treat all of them the same, simply because it would be too 
expensive to require the liquidator to investigate the relative positions of all the claimants in terms of 
vulnerability to serious detriment. What is more, it would be next to impossible for him to determine 
whether a particular employee was more vulnerable than others in this insolvency because, for example, 
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he had been less cautious in planning for such a contingency than all the others, or because he had more 
expensive tastes for consumables like holidays, etc.135 Most liquidators asked to embark upon such an 
exercise would necessarily exhaust all available assets along the way, and no one would get anything. 
Apart from being inefficient, wastage of this nature does not lead to fairness either. Again, then, 
“equality” is resorted to because the costs of employing any more appropriate method of distribution 
(including one which is fairer in the abstract) would outweigh its benefits.136 
 
The third manifestation of formal equality has already been mentioned. Preferential claims are 
also treated “equally” inter se. It is interesting to note that even here, the reason behind this seems to be 
exactly the same. Notionally, of course, employees and the Crown are the two types of preferential 
claimant. But the employees of an insolvent firm, in recognition of their especially vulnerable position, 
have been accorded rights which -- in their capacity as creditors -- make them almost unconcerned 
about their employer’s insolvency. This is because of the provisions of what is now the Employment 
Rights Act 1996 (ERA). This regime “provides for different and generally more extensive protection 
for an employee than under the Insolvency Act”.137 Under it, the Secretary of State, through the 
Redundancy Payment Service, makes payments to employees from the National Insurance Fund. The 
ERA scheme covers (inter alia) up to eight weeks of unpaid wages and salaries, wages during the 
statutory minimum notice period, up to six weeks of holiday pay, and a basic award for unfair dismissal. 
These payments are likely to be larger than those given preferential status by the Insolvency Act. For 
the payments made, the Secretary of State is subrogated to the employees’ rights.138 
 
Relevant to our discussion is the fact that, “once employees’ rights under ERA are factored into 
the overall picture..., the Crown, by subrogation, takes over the claims of employees in a very large 
proportion of cases and is often the sole preferential creditor”.139 Again, then, we have an excellent 
explanation (though historically perhaps a partial one) for the fact that preferential claims rank equally 
amongst themselves. Most of these claims are held by the same actor, the Crown. So again it would 
simply be pointless to provide for different priorities for these claims. Why expend resources 
differentiating these claims both ex ante and ex post, when in most cases any such differentiation would 
merely be notional? It is submitted that this provides further support for the proposition that formal 
equality in insolvency law (including that enshrined in the pari passu rule) is resorted to only when the 
costs of providing otherwise would outweigh the benefits. It is for this reason that the pari passu 
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principle is best regarded as a fall-back provision. It is submitted that it plays no other role in 
insolvency distributions.140 
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that even if analytically accurate, the arguments made in this 
Section are incomplete from a historical perspective. To meet this apparent deficiency, here is one 
hypothesis. The search costs for ascertaining optimum rankings for different types of claim depend 
either on the availability of a theory of finance, or on a process of trial-error-adjustment by the parties 
themselves. When the former method is unavailable or underdeveloped, the time component of search 
costs (incurred during trial-error-adjustment) is high. So initially, only the more obvious methods of 
distribution (e.g. pari passu), and of bargaining for priority (e.g. rudimentary forms of security), which 
have therefore been developed earlier and employed for longer, would be cost-effective. So after 1543, 
when statute first provided for claims against bankrupts to be paid in “a portion rate and rate like, 
according to the quantity of their debt”,141 this initially might in fact have been a rule of almost 
universal application, perhaps only secured and Crown claims being exempt.142 Again, this would have 
been so not because Parliament and the parties themselves at that time were fairer than they are now, 
but simply because no better method of distribution had then been discovered (i.e. none was cost-
effective). But as better (fairer and more efficient) methods were discovered both through trial-error-
adjustment and the development of theories of finance, pari passu would quickly be relegated to a mere 
fall-back provision even as applied to unsecured claims.  
 
This hypothesis predicts that unless all creditors in real life are truly equal in all relevant 
respects, there would always be an increasing tendency for a fair and efficient insolvency law system to 
develop different priorities for different types of claim, to the full extent of all the assets generally 
available in liquidation. This then implies that attempts to “equalise” distributions to creditors who are 
different in relevant respects are thoroughly misguided, since they impede the development of a fairer 
and more efficient system. 
 
7. THE REMOVAL OF TAX CLAIMS PREFERENCES 
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The analysis in the previous Section allows us to examine the Government’s recent proposal to remove 
the preferential status enjoyed by certain tax claims (discussed above).143 The proposal is conceived as 
“an important and integral part” of a package of reforms to corporate insolvency law, which also 
includes the abolition of administrative receivership and changes to the administration procedure to 
make it more “streamlined”, and thus the successor to receivership.144 The White Paper suggests that in 
insolvencies where there is a floating charge, a certain proportion of the funds generated by assets 
subject to it would be “ringfenced” to ensure the benefit of the proposed change goes to unsecured 
creditors rather than to the charge-holder.145 The Government predicts that the removal of tax claim 
preferences will bring “major benefits to trade and other unsecured creditors, including small 
businesses”.146 Importantly, however, the “preferential status of certain claims by employees in 
insolvency proceedings... within certain limits [also discussed above] will remain, as will the rights of 
those subrogated to them”.147 It will be argued in this Section that the proposal to remove the 
preferential status of tax claims is unlikely to bring any significant benefit to unsecured creditors, and 
thus does not fulfil its stated objective. In addition, the proposal is incoherent. 
 
 In order to evaluate the proposal, we should begin by trying to estimate the quantum of the 
additional benefits to unsecured creditors which can be expected to result from its implementation. 
Even a very rough estimate requires a lengthy calculation, and because of the imprecision of the data 
available, the estimate here will indeed be rough. But it will soon become apparent that this does not 
matter to the point being made here. Unless otherwise stated, any doubts in the figures are resolved so 
as to maximise the expected additional benefit to unsecured creditors from the proposed change. 
 
At the moment, total liabilities of companies that undergo a formal insolvency procedure during 
a year are estimated to be about £42b.148 Of this, about 35% is owed to banks.149 Let us suppose that 
80% of bank debt is secured by the company’s assets.150 So secured creditors are owed, roughly, 28% 
of the total outstanding debt. Preferential creditors get back about 30% of what they are owed.151 The 
amount actually paid out as dividends in right of tax claims preferences is around £100m.152 So 
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preferential tax claims themselves amount to some £333m. The amount owed in right of employee 
preferences is an estimated £200m.153 Altogether, then, preferential debts constitute about 1.3% of the 
total debts owed by insolvent companies. It follows that unsecured creditors are owed about 70.7% of 
the total outstanding debt of companies in insolvency proceedings. This amounts to around £29.69b. 
They get an average of 7 pence on the pound,154 or about £2.1b (£2100m) today. 
 
Now the Government estimates that the removal of tax claims preferences would bring "up to" 
£100m more for unsecured creditors.155 So after the removal of preferential status for tax claims, 
unsecured creditors will get £2200m.156 In other words, their recoveries would go up to 7.4% once the 
proposal in implemented. This is of course an increase of less than one-half of one penny over what 
they currently get! And that does not take into account that all tax claims would then also rank 
alongside other unsecured claims.157  
 
It should be obvious, then, that even if these calculations are wide of the mark (so that the actual 
increase will be twice, thrice, or even five times this much), the average recovery rates for unsecured 
creditors in an overwhelming majority of formal insolvency proceedings are unlikely to go up to the 
extent that such creditors would be appreciably better off. The Government’s claim that this “important 
and integral” part of its reform package will bring “major benefits” to them therefore seems simply 
unsustainable. In addition, and in line with the analysis in the previous Sections, the reader should note 
that it makes very obvious sense to subject to the pari passu rule the tiny additional sums which will 
become available in many formal insolvency proceedings because of the proposed change. For these 
additional sums, it would be entirely wasteful to attempt to think up some other set of priorities. The 
costs of doing that would be quite unjustified in view of the size of the expected benefits. 
 
So much for the suggestion that the proposal is likely to be inefficacious. To understand why it is 
incoherent, we should recall that because of the rights of employee-creditors of insolvent companies 
under the ERA, the claims apparently held by them and given preferential status, are mostly vested in 
the Crown by way of subrogation. So preferential tax claims and preferential ‘employee’ claims are in 
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most cases held by the same actor. Nor does this fact go unnoticed in the White Paper. As already 
mentioned, the Paper not only states that certain employee claims will retain their preferential status, 
but also explicitly includes within this reservation “the rights of those subrogated to them”,158 or in 
other words, of the Crown itself. Now the supposed rationale for removing the preferential status of tax 
claims is presumably the well-rehearsed one that the Crown is better able to absorb the loss of not being 
paid by some of its debtors, than are some other categories of creditor, for example, weak trade 
creditors.159 But if this is accepted, it surely follows that ‘employee’ claims, also generally held by the 
Crown, should lose their preferential status for exactly the same reason. Employees might deserve 
greater protection in their employer’s insolvency than other types of claimant, but if they have already 
been reimbursed from the National Insurance Fund, then the competition is no longer between them and 
other unsecured creditors, but between the latter and the Crown. So there seems little sense in 
suggesting reform to only one category of preferential claims, when the reason why that reform is 
considered desirable is equally a reason to change the other category as well. This is especially relevant 
given that the stated aim of improving the prospects of unsecured creditors is expected to be fulfilled to 
a negligible degree in any case.160 
 
At the very least, the Government bears the burden of showing what makes preferential tax 
claims different from most preferential ‘employee’ claims. One way in which it might attempt to do so 
would be to provide better data than is currently available, and thus rebut the premise of this argument, 
that the Crown holds, by subrogation, most preferential ‘employee’ claims. But even then, the obvious 
solution would be to adopt the approach enshrined in the US Bankruptcy Code, which provides that an 
entity subrogated to the rights of, inter alia, the employee-creditors of a bankrupt company, is not 
entitled to enjoy the statutory preferential status provided to some of their claims.161 This would ensure 
that the preferential status of ‘employee’ debts was retained only to the extent that employees 
themselves would benefit from it. Unless the Government explains why this is unacceptable, it seems 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that its proposal is based on an arbitrary and thus unjustifiable 
distinction. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
Some years ago, Bridge concluded his brief review of the clash between pari passu distribution on the 
one hand, and the freedom of contract which allows parties to grant and take security on the other, by 
framing the issue thus: “Is the pari passu principle so strong that the burden of proving efficiency rests 
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upon those who support secured credit, or is freedom of contract paramount so that the burden falls 
upon those who oppose security?”162 Even without invoking freedom of contract,163 here (it is 
submitted) is the answer. The first premise of those attacking the priority accorded to secured claims -- 
that unequal treatment of claims is anomalous, somehow a deviation from the “strong” “equality” norm 
-- is quite false. If anything, it is the pari passu principle which constitutes an isolated enclave of 
“equality” in a (formally) unequal insolvency world. In that real world, its status -- considered as a rule 
governing distribution of assets -- hovers somewhere between falsehood and tautology. So with respect, 
assertions that this principle is all-pervasive in the liquidation regime, that it underlies some of the best-
known avoidance provisions of that regime, or that it provides the only alternative to an undesirable 
free-for-all, all stand rebutted as based on a fallacy. They must all be abandoned. So must the argument 
that the pari passu principle is necessary to ensure fairness in liquidation. 
 
It is submitted that it is the critics of differing priorities for different types of claim, including 
those attacking the full priority of secured claims, who must now be on the defensive, at least on these 
grounds. The general rule in insolvency law, its deeply-embedded norm, seems to be that the assets 
available in insolvent estates are to be distributed “unequally”, unless attempting to do so would be 
pointless because wasteful. It might be that the different priorities afforded to different types of 
claimant are sometimes arbitrary. It might be that this area of the law could do with extensive re-
thinking and rationalisation. Even then, it would not follow that what should replace the current system 
is one which crudely equalises all creditors in their debtor’s insolvency. Formal equality of that sort is 
not the natural alternative. It will not win by default. Not only is it rare and unnecessary in the real 
world, it is also useless as an ideal. So it must be argued for as much as any other system of priorities 
proposed as a replacement for the current one, and it would be at least as contentious as any of them. 
Those arguing for (a more) “equal” treatment of all claims must therefore bear the heavy burden of 
showing why moves towards formal equality are desirable. 
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